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NOTES 
The Single-Scheme Exception to Criminal Deportations and 
the Case for Chevron's Step Tuo 
David A. Luigs 
lNTRODUCTION 
In 1992, the State of Georgia convicted Akintunde Taofik 
Animashaun of two counts of criminal forgery.1 Both of 
Anim.ashaun's crimes resulted from- actions he took as part of a 
plan to steal some furniture. First, Animashaun completed an in-
stant credit application at a furniture store using a false identity. 
1\vo days later, he arrived at the store's warehouse to pick up the 
furniture and presented a receipt with the forged signature. These 
actions supported convictions for two separate crimes: for forgery 
on the credit application, and for forgery on the delivery receipt.2 
Because Animashaun was a native and citizen of Nigeria who 
had entered the United States in 1981 as a student, his two crimes 
enabled the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to insti-
tute deportation proceedings against him on its authority to deport 
aliens who commit multiple crimes.3 Although Animashaun had 
become a permanent resident after marrying an American citizen, 
1. See Animashaun v. INS, 990 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 557 (1993). The 
Fifth Circuit's opinion recites all of the facts that are discussed in the text 
2. The Fifth Circuit's opinion does not explain the exact relationship between the receipt 
and the credit application. The full discussion in the opinion reads: "On August 11, 
Animashaun completed an instant credit application at a furniture store using a false identity; 
on August 13, Animashaun arrived at the store's warehouse to take delivery of that furniture 
by presenting the receipt with the forged signature." Animashaun, 990 F.2d at 237. It ap-
pears that the "receipt" was a copy of the "application" that Animashaun had previously 
filled out, such that it constituted a second forgery because it was another presentation of a 
forged signature. 
3. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 125l(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
(Supp. II 1990). Tue Attorney General is principally responsible for enforcing and adminis-
tering the immigration laws. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, 
IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND PouCY 101 (2d ed. 1991). These laws dictate which aliens, 
under what conditions, can immigrate to the United States, id. at 119, and when they can be 
deported, id. at 498. The Attorney General has delegated most of the responsibility for en-
forcing and administering the immigration Jaws to the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS). Id. at 101. 
The INS performs a variety of immigration-related tasks dealing with enforcement, ser-
vice, and adjudication. Id. at 102-04. Deportation is one of the INS's enforcement functions; 
it removes an alien from the United States. Id. at 475. The immigration Jaws provide various 
grounds by which the INS can impose this process on an alien. For example, the INS may 
deport an alien if she misrepresented material facts on her immigration application or if she 
has committed certain crimes while legally residing in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 
(Supp. II 1990); see also ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra, at 498-543. 
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he remained an alien subject to the immigration laws. The legal 
authority for Animashaun's deportation derived from section 
241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which au-
thorizes the INS to deport legal resident aliens who are convicted of 
"two or more crimes involving moral turpitude."4 
The deportation provision provides an exception, however, for 
those aliens who commit multiple crimes "arising out of a single 
scheme of criminal misconduct. "5 Relying on a recent Ninth Circuit 
opinion6 that interprets this exception to cover multiple crimes that 
an alien plans and executes together as part of a single plan, 
Animashaun argued that his convictions fell within the exception 
because both of. his crimes arose from his single plan to steal furni-
ture. The INS disagreed, contending that the exception applies 
only when an alien's multiple crimes arise out of a single act. 
At a deportation hearing,7 an immigration judge agreed with the 
INS's single-act interpretation and held that Animashaun's crimes 
did not fall within the exception.s Animashaun appealed to the 
To initiate a deportation proceeding, an INS officer files an order to show cause with the 
office of the local immigration judge and serves the order on the affected alien. This order, 
which requires the alien to show why she should not be deported, explains the deportation 
proceeding and infonns the alien of the statutory and factual grounds for deportation. Id. at 
543. The inu¢gration judge presides over deportation hearings and decides whether to order 
tennination, grant pennanent residence, or order deportation. Id. at 543. 
4. 8 U.S.C. § 125l{a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990). There is a long line of cases explaining 
which crimes involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., Okoroha v. INS, 715 F.2d 380 {8th Cir. 1983) 
{holding that possessing stolen property involves moral turpitude); Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 
247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892 {1957) {holding that tax evasion involves 
moral turpitude); In re Flores, 17 I & N Dec. 225 (BIA 1980) (holding that fraud, as a general 
rule, involves moral turpitude); In re Rosario, 15 I & N Dec. 416 (BIA 1975) (holding that 
voluntary manslaughter, even without malice, constitutes moral turpitude); In re Moore, 13 I 
& N Dec. 711 (BIA 1971) (holding that breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny 
involves moral turpitude). See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 503-24; 
CHARLEs GORDON & STANLEY MAli.MAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 71.05 
(1994). 
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added). The full text of this 
provision reads: "Any alien who at any time after entry is convicted of two or more crimes 
involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regard-
less of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single 
trial, is deportable." 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)-(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990). 
6. Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990). 
7. At a contested deportation hearing, a trial attorney presents the INS's case, and the 
INS bears the burden of proving the alien's deportability by "clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing evidence." Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966). The immigration judge hears 
evidence and testimony presented by both sides and comes to a decision ordering a tennina-
tion, granting pennanent residence, or ordering deportation. See generally ALEINIKOFF & 
MARTIN, supra note 3, at 110; Jack Wassennan, Practical Aspects of Representing an Alien at 
a Deportation Hearing, 14 SAN Dmoo L. REv. 111 (1976). 
8. The INS does not adjudicate most immigration issues; instead, a separate umbrella 
organization within the Department of Justice, the Executive Office of Immigration Review 
(EOIR), contains other adjudicative bodies that hear most immigration disputes. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 3.l(a)(l) (1994). The Department of Justice segregated these adjudicators - the immigra-
tion judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the Administrative Appeals Unit 
(AAU) - from the INS in an effort to separate the enforcement and the adjudication of 
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Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)9 which affirmed the immigra-
tion judge's decision. The BIA adopted the INS's view that crimes 
arise out of a single scheme only when they are the consequence of 
a single act: 
When an alien performs an act that in and of itself constitutes a com-
plete, individual, and distinct crime, he is deportable when he again 
commits such an act, even though one may closely follow the other, 
be similar in character, and even be part of an overall plan of criminal 
misconduct.10 
The BIA reasoned that Animashaun's crimes did not fall within the 
single-scheme exception because they "were two complete, individ-
ual, and distinct acts"11 - namely, the two· different instances of 
presenting a false name. 
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit,12 Animashaun again challenged 
the BIA's single-act interpretation of the single-scheme exception, 
but the Fifth Circuit concluded that it had no choice but to adopt 
immigration issues. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 109. Aleinikoff & Martin 
explain that the 
[n]ew regulations separated the corps of immigration judges from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service and placed them in a new unit, known as the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (EOIR), located in the Department of Justice and directly account-
able to the Associate Attorney General. ... [I]t is clear that EOIR now controls the 
budget available to immigration judges and provides directly for support services. To-
day, no immigration judge is answerable to anyone in the Service, and this different line 
of accountability provides an improved structural assurance of adjudicative neutrality. 
Id. at 109-10. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for "special inquiry officers," 
now known as immigration judges, to conduct the most dramatic and important adjudica-
tions: proceedings to exclude or deport aliens. 8 U.S.C. §§ 10l(b)(4), 1225(b), 1226(a), 
1252(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Immigration judges also take part in "proceedings to rescind 
an admitted immigrant's adjustment of status under [§ 246 of the Immigration and National-
ity Act], in proceedings to withdraw the approval of schools previously authorized for attend-
ance by nonimmigrant students, 8 C.F.R. § 214.4, and in hearing challenges brought by aliens 
ordered not to leave the country under the departure control provisions of 8 C.F.R. Part 
215." ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 110. 
9. Aliens found to be deportable at an initial deportation hearing have the right to appeal 
to the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1994). The Attorney General set up the BIA as 
a multimember body to review these appeals. Although the BIA has existed since 1940, it 
has never been authorized by statute and exists only because of regulations promulgated by 
the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(a)(l) (1994); see also ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra 
note 3, at 112. 
10. Animashaun v. INS, 990 F.2d 234, 237-38 (5th Cir.) (quoting the BIA's decision in In 
re Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992 WL 195812 (BIA May 22, 1992)), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 557 (1993); see infra section I.B.1 (explaining the BIA's single-act test). 
11. Animashaun, 990 F.2d at 236. 
12. Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act establishes federal judicial re-
view of deportation orders. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (Supp. II 1990). The statute provides that 
the procedure established by the Hobbs Act, codifie9 at 28 U.S.C. ch. 158, shall be the exclu-
sive procedure for review of deportation orders. The Hobbs Act governs judicial review of 
several other administrative agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission, 
the Federal Maritime Commission, and the Interstate Commerce Commission. See 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2341-51 (1988). This Act vests the power of review in the federal appellate, rather than 
district, courts. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 862. These courts are required to 
uphold the Board's fact findings if they are supported by "reasonable, substantial, and proba-
tive evidence." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1988). 
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the BIA's "single-act" test.13 The court explained that because the 
meaning of the statute was ambiguous, the landmark Supreme 
Court case of Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. 14 required the court to defer to the BIA's view. In Chevron, 
the Supreme Court announced that a federal court applying an am-
biguous statute must defer to any reasonable interpretation 
adopted by the agency atlministering the statute. Courts have gen-
erally referred to this rule as having two steps: At step one, a court 
determines whether the statute clearly answers the interpretive 
question at issue. If the statute is unambiguous, the court will give 
effect to the statute's clear meaning. But if the statute is ambigu-
ous, the court moves on to step two: determining whether the 
agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable and permissible. 
Chevron requires courts to defer to reasonable agency interpreta-
tions of ambiguous statutes.15 Applying the Chevron rule to the 
Animashaun case, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it had to defer to 
the BIA's "single-act" test, and it affirmed Animashaun's deporta-
tion order.16 
Other circuits, however, have interpreted the single-scheme ex-
ception differently and refused to defer to the BIA's interpretation. 
Instead of focusing on whether the multiple crimes arise from a sin-
gle act, these courts focus on the alien's state of mind. In applying 
their interpretations of the exception, the Second, Third, and Ninth 
Circuits ask whether the alien's crimes were planned together and 
executed as part of a single plan.11 The First Circuit asks a slightly 
different question - whether the alien had sufficient time to reflect 
between the commission of the two crimes to change his mind and 
halt his course of criminal misconduct.1B None of these courts that 
13. Animashaun, 990 F.2d at 237. 
14. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
15. See infra Part II (discussing the rule in Chevron). 
16. 990 F.2d at 237. The court made clear, however, that precedent required its holding 
because a prior Ftfth Circuit case had held that Chevron applied to the single-scheme excep-
tion, requiring deference to the BIA's single-act test. See infra note 60 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Ftfth Circuit's precedent requiring the Animashaun court to defer to the 
BIA's view). The court hinted, however, that it thought Chevron deference was inappropri· 
ate in this case and that absent stare decisis, it might have held that Chevron did not require it 
to defer to the BIA's interpretation of the single-scheme exception. 990 F.2d at 237 n.3 
("Were we reviewing this agency interpretation without our precedential guidance, we may 
have reached a different result. We are, of course, bound by our [prior] holding •••• "); see 
also infra Part III (arguing that Chevron does not require courts to defer to the BIA's single· 
act test). In 1993, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on Animashaun's case, and he was 
deported. Animashaun v. INS, 114 S. Ct. 557 (1993). 
17. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990); Nason v. INS, 394 
F.2d 223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); Sawkow v. INS, 314 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 
1963). See generally infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the single-plan test). 
18. See Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977). See 
generally jnfra Part I.B.3 (discussing the time-to-reflect test). 
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reject the BIA's interpretation, however, have analyzed the issue 
under Chevron. . 
This Note applies the two-step Chevron analysis to the single-
scheme exception and argues that courts should reject the BIA's 
single-act test. In applying Chevron, this Note uses the narrow con-
troversy over the proper interpretation of the single-scheme excep-
tion as a window on the larger ambiguity that plagues the Supreme 
Court's Chevron jurisprudence. This Note suggests an answer to a 
broader issue that has remained unclear under the Supreme Court's 
precedents: how courts should review agency interpretations at 
Chevron's second step. Part I discusses the text and legislative his-
tory of the single-scheme exception and surveys how courts have 
interpreted the exception, explaining the three competing ap-
proaches: the single-act test, the single-plan test, and the time-to-
reftect test. 
To determine how courts should apply Chevron to the BIA's 
choice among these tests, Part II focuses on what courts examine at 
each of Chevron's two steps. This Part first explains the numerous 
criteria the Supreme Court has employed under Chevron's first step 
in deciding whether a statute clearly answers an interpretive contro-
versy. Then it addresses the broader question on which the 
Supreme Court has provided little explicit guidance: what courts 
should do at Chevron's step two. Part II argues that although 
courts have often engaged in cursory review of agency interpreta-
tions at Chevron's second step, the rationale of Chevron and a care-
ful review of the Supreme Court's case law on deference to agency 
interpretations of statutes support a more rigorous standard of re-
view. This Part concludes by providing an appropriate structure for 
judicial review at Chevron's step two. 
Part ID applies this understanding of Chevron's two steps to 
conclude that courts should not defer to the BIA's single-act test. 
This Part first argues that the ordinary meaning of "single scheme" 
embraces the single-plan test. But even if the meaning of the ex-
ception were ambiguous, this Part concludes that courts should re-
ject the BIA's single-act test at Chevron's step two - as an 
unreasonable and impermissible reading of the statute. 
I. APPROACHES To INTERPRETING THE SINGLE-SCHEME 
EXCEPTION 
This Part describes the background to the controversy over in-
terpreting the single-scheme exception. Section I.A examines how 
the text and legislative history of the exception leave the meaning 
of "single scheme" unclear. Section I.B des·cribes the approaches 
taken by the BIA and the different courts in defining the exception. 
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A. The Text and Legislative History of the Exception 
Section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
permits the INS to deport an alien who commits two or more 
crimes of moral turpitude, but it creates an exception for aliens 
whose multiple crimes arise out of a single scheme of criminal mis-
conduct.19 The section provides: 
Any alien who at any time after entry is convicted of two or more 
crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of 
criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and 
regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is 
deportable.20 
Congress gave no explicit guidance regarding how this exception 
should be understood. The Act's "definitions" section, while thor-
ough, does not define single scheme of criminal misconduct,21 nor 
does the legislative history shed any light on the intent of Congress 
in drafting this provision.22 The House Report advises merely that 
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990). The Immigration and Nationality Act 
authorizes the INS to deport aliens for several other reasons. The INS may deport five broad 
classes of aliens: (1) aliens who were excludable at the time they entered the country or who 
have violated or adjusted their status since entering the country in such a way as to become 
deportable (e.g., by smuggling illegal aliens into the United States or by failing to maintain 
employment); (2) aliens who have committed "criminal offenses," with different rules gov-
erning aliens with a single criminal conviction, multiple convictions (the subject of this Note), 
aggravated felonies, controlled substances, firearm felonies, and other miscellaneous crimes; 
(3) aliens who fail to register or provide a change of address to the Attorney General as 
required by the Act or who have engaged in document fraud; (4) aliens who are deportable 
on security and related grounds (e.g., aliens who endanger national security or who engage in 
terrorist activity); and (5) aliens who, within five years of entry, have become "public 
charges." 8 U.S.C. § 1251(Supp.II1990). 
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990). 
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (defining more than fifty terms). 
22. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 2046, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1753; S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653. Courts that have examined the 
statute's legislative history have universally agreed that it is not helpful regarding this issue. 
See Nguyen v. INS, 991 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The legislative history of the 1952 
Immigration and Nationality Act offers no illumination as to congressional intent regarding 
what constitutes a single scheme of criminal misconduct for purposes of the exception •••• "); 
Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448, 449 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977) ("The 
legislative history, while atmospheric, sheds no light on [§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)]."); Nason v. 
INS, 394 F.2d 223, 227 {2d Cir.) ("[T]here is no meaningful legislative history to illumine the 
meaning of the specific statutory language 'two crimes ..• not arising out of a single scheme 
of criminal misconduct'"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825, 828-
29 (9th Cir. 1959) {"The Act does not define what is a 'single scheme of criminal misconduct.' 
Nor does the legislative history shed any light on what was the intent of Congress in drafting 
this provision."); In re Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992 WL 195812 at *3-4 (BIA May 
22, 1992) ("[T]he legislative history provides [no] assistance or insight into what Congress 
meant by the phrase 'single scheme of criminal misconduct.'"). 
Some courts have observed, however, that the 1952 Immigration Act "was looked on 
generally as more restrictive than prior legislation." Pacheco, 546 F.2d at 449. "The section 
itself replaced a gentler one under which the alien, to be deported, must have been 'sen-
tenced more than once to [a term of one year or more].'" Pacheco, 546 F.2d at 449 n.3; see 
also Costello v. INS, 311F.2d343, 348 (2d Cir. 1962). But the generalized idea that the prior 
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"[t]he bill contains detailed and comprehensive provisions relating 
to the apprehension and deportation of aliens who are within the 
deportable classes."23 This Report discusses several of the defini-
tions contained in the Act's definitions section but does not advise 
how to construe undefined terms.24 
B. Three Different Interpretations 
The different immigration, district, and circuit courts that have 
considered Section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) have interpreted the single-
scheme exception in different ways. Although the courts' opinions 
are often imprecise and unclear, these interpretations can be 
grouped into three competing approaches: the "single-act" test, the 
"single-plan" test, and the "time-to-reflect" test. The single-act test 
asks whether the nature of the crimes essentially makes them one 
act. The single-plan test looks to whether the alien planned the en-
tire program of criminal misconduct at a single time before the 
crimes. The time-to-reflect test focuses on whether the alien had 
sufficient time between the commission of the crimes to reflect 
upon them and change her mind. 
1. The Nature of the Crimes: The Single-Act Test 
Although the scope of the BIA's definition of section 241's sin-
gle-scheme exception is not entirely clear,25 its single-act test ap-
pears to focus on the nature of the alien's crimes to determine 
whether they are sufficiently related that they essentially constitute 
one act. As evidenced by the Animashaun case, at its most restric-
tive this test requires that all the crimes be traceable to a single 
physical act. The BIA explained this test in a recent decision, In re 
Adetiba:26 
[W]hen an alien has performed an act, which, in and of itself consti-
tutes a complete, individual, and distinct crime, he is deportable when 
he again commits such an act, even though one may closely follow the 
statute was gentler to aliens does not help to determine how much more restrictive the new 
statute was intended to be. Thus, the vast majority of courts have not relied on this idea to 
support their reasoning in defining the exception. But see Costello, 311 F.2d at 348, in which 
the Second Circuit rejected the notion that a single-scheme should be defined as a "common 
..• plan" in part because "there is no denying the fact that the Congress by the 1952 Act 
intended to make it easier rather than more difficult to deport aliens who were recurrent 
criminals." However, the Costello court acknowledged that this was mere dictum, observing 
"(b]ut this (discussion] is by the way." 311 F.2d at 348. Later the Second Circuit explicitly 
adopted a version of the single-plan test. See Nason, 394 F.2d at 227. 
23. H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 22, at 56, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1711. 
24. H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 22, at 31-34, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1683-
86. 
25. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (describing the various different formu-
lations the BIA has developed to articulate its interpretation of the single-scheme exception). 
26. In reAdetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992 WL 195812 (BIA May 22, 1992). 
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other, be similar in character, and even be part of an overall plan of 
criminal misconduct. [Such an approach] recognize[s] that the statu-
tory language was meant to distinguish cases where there are separate 
and distinct crimes, but they are performed in furtherance of a single 
criminal episode. 
Under this analysis, there would exist a single scheme of criminal 
misconduct where one crime constitutes a lesser offense of another or 
where two crimes fl.ow from and are the natural consequences of a 
single act of criminal misconduct.27 
This language suggests that the BIA believes that Congress created 
the single-scheme exception to ensure that crimes that were merely 
two different aspects of the same physical act of wrongdoing would 
not count as two crimes for purposes of deportation. Under this 
narrow conception of the exception, it does not matter whether the 
crimes are similar in nature, close in time, or part of the same plan; 
so long as they can be traced to two separate physical acts, they fall 
outside the exception. The BIA elaborated on this interpretation 
by providing an example that a single scheme occurs when an alien 
both possesses and passes a counterfeit bill.28 The BIA apparently 
considers this to be a single scheme because an alien is guilty of 
both these crimes when he performs the single physical act of pass-
ing the counterfeit bill. 
2. A Prior Conceived Program: The Single-Plan Test 
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have read the single-
scheme exception to require a court to determine whether there 
was a moment prior to the crimes when the alien conceived of a 
single coherent plan embracing all of her crimes.29 The Ninth Cir-
cuit recently described this test in Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS,30 ex-
plaining that where the evidence "shows that the two predicate 
27. Adetiba, 1992WL195812, at *l (citations omitted). There is some ambiguity in this 
language, however, and perhaps the BIA could reread this definition to create a "single-
episode" test that would cover more multiple-crime situations than the restrictive "single-
act" test But the BIA has not articulated any separate test to determine when multiple 
crimes arise from a single episode. Therefore, given that Adetiba's narrow language requires 
that the crimes to result from a single physical act and given the stringent application of this 
language in the Animashaun case, this Note takes the BIA's test as it has been applied. But 
see infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (describing other ways the BIA has previously 
interpreted the exception). 
28. In re D, 5 I & N Dec. 728, 730 (BIA 1954). The BIA has also inexplicably provided as 
an example the case of an alien who breaks and enters a store with the intent to commit 
larceny and, in connection with that criminal act, also commits an assault with a deadly 
weapon. In re D, 5 I & N Dec. at 730; see In re B, 8 I & N Dec. 236, 239 (BIA 1958). But 
these two crimes, of course, result from two different physical acts. Perhaps this 1958 exam-
ple is simply out-of-line with the BIA's current test 
29. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990); Nason v. INS, 394 
F.2d 223 (2d Cir.}, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); Sawkow v. INS, 314 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 
1963). 
30. 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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crimes were planned at the same time and executed in accordance 
with that plan,'' the crimes arise out of a single scheme.31 The 
Ninth Circuit explicitly distinguished the government's single-act 
test: "The statute exempts crimes arising out of a 'single scheme of 
criminal misconduct' and not those out of a single criminal act, as 
the government would have us read it."32 
Other courts applying the single-act test have defined the excep-
tion much like the Ninth Circuit. In Nason v. INS,33 the Second 
Circuit similarly defined the exception by looking for a single plan: 
"[T]he word 'scheme' implies a specific, more or less articulated 
and coherent plan or program of future action .... "34 The Second 
Circuit also rejected the single-act test, observing that "[t]he statu-
tory language, 'a single scheme of criminal misconduct,' is not so 
narrow as a single criminal act or transaction."35 The Third Cir-
cuit36 and the few district court decisions construing the statute are 
consistent with this understanding of the single-plan test.37 
31. 910 F.2d at 616. 
32. 910 F.2d at 616. 
33. 394 F.2d 223 {2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). But see Costello v. INS, 311 
F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1962), where the Second Circuit earlier had criticized in dicta possible 
extreme versions of the single-plan test: 
We would not wish, however, to be thought to subscribe to the views expressed in the 
cases [supporting the single-plan test] ... nor would it seem reasonable to suppose that 
the Congress intended to grant immunity from deportation to those who over a period 
of time pursued a course of criminal misconduct, involving numerous successive, sepa-
rate crimes, consummated at different times but in the same manner, or with the same 
associates, or even by the use of the same fraudulent devices, disguises, tools or weap-
ons. Nor, in the case of successive bank robberies ... would it seem that these could be 
said to have arisen out of a single rather than two separate schemes of criminal miscon-
duct, simply because the robbers, prior to the first robbery, had in mind and had dis-
cussed the robbery of the second bank ..•• 
Costello, 311 F.2d at 348. Nevertheless, this dictum from Costello was implicitly rejected 
when the Second Circuit articulated its version of the single-plan test in Nason. See Nason, 
394 F.2d at 227. Moreover, the BIA seems to concede that the Second Circuit has endorsed 
the single-plan test In re Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992WL195812, at *4 {BIA May 
22, 1992) (citing Nason to include the Second Circuit, along with the Third and the Ninth, as 
the jurisdictions applying a "more expansive interpretation of the [statutory] language."). 
34. 394 F.2d at 227. 
35. 394 F.2d at 227 {"Congress .•• reserved deportation for those who, having completed 
a criminal scheme, proceeded to commit a fresh crime or to renew the prior course of crimi-
nal conduct"). 
36. The exact test followed by the Third Circuit is unclear. However, in Sawkow v. INS, 
314 F.2d 34, 37-38 {3d Cir. 1963), the court approvingly cited Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825 {9th 
Cir. 1959), a case from the single-plan Ninth Circuit, in reversing a BIA deportation order. 
The BIA has cited Sawkow in listing the Third Circuit, along with the Second and Ninth, as a 
jurisdiction applying a "more expansive interpretation of the [statutory] language" than its 
single-act test Adetiba, 1992 WL 195812, at *4. 
37. See Barrese v. Ryan, 203 F. Supp. 880, 886-87 (D. Conn. 1962) (rejecting the Board's 
interpretation of the statute, that a "single scheme" must be equated with "one criminal 
episode"); Zito v. Moutai, 174 F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Ill. 1959) ("[D]eportation may not be 
predicated upon offenses which are part of a single continuing enterprise even though the 
offenses are separated by time."); Jeronimo v. Murff, 157 F. Supp. 808, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) 
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These courts have clarified that to satisfy this single-plan test a 
plan must be a coherent, premeditated design embracing all of the 
alien's future crimes. For example, the Second Circuit in Nason ex-
plained how an alien's vague intentions did not rise to the level of a 
plan: 
Petitioner's nebulous intention to repeat his crime ... some day in the 
indefinite future, will not bridge the gap of nine months [between the 
crimes]. The word 'scheme' implies a specific, more or less articulated 
and coherent plan or program of future action, much more than a 
vague, indeterminate expectation to repeat a prior criminal modus 
operandi. As used in the statute, 'scheme' is not to be construed as an 
abstract concept or strategy capable of future application at any time 
and any place, but planned definitely for none.3s 
The Ninth Circuit cited Nason in adopting this strict definition of 
plan in a recent case, Leon-Hernandez v. INS.39 In Leon-Her-
nandez, an alien who was convicted of two acts of sexual miscon-
duct with a minor argued that his crimes arose from a single scheme 
because both crimes resulted from his ongoing relationship with the 
minor whom he believed to be his girlfriend. The court rejected 
this relationship as sufficient to constitute a single scheme, because 
Leon-Hernandez 
did not show that the crimes were executed according to any consid-
ered plan .... At the very most [the evidence of his relationship with 
the minor] implies only that Leon-Hernandez had, at some time, a 
"nebulous intention to repeat his crime with the same ... victim[ ] 
some day in the indefinite future." In the absence of evidence of a 
more conscious, coherent "plan or program of future action," the 
BIA's determination that Leon-Hernandez's crimes did not arise 
from a single scheme of criminal misconduct is reasonable.40 
These cases demonstrate that although defendants may allege that 
their crimes were carried out pursuant to a single plan, courts re-
quire more than mere vague or continuing criminal intentions to 
satisfy the single-plan test. 
Much of the case law explaining the scope of this test concerns 
what evidence the INS must present in order to meet its burden of 
showing that the alien's crimes did not arise out of a single 
scheme.41 The practical effect of the single-plan test has been de-
(observing that all the acts and transactions described in the indictment were closely "con-
nected together" constituting the "parts" of one "scheme and plan"). 
38. 394 F.2d at 227. The Second Circuit twice considered Nason's case. Nason v. INS 
(Nason I), 370 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1967); Nason v. INS (Nason 11), 394 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968) (case referred to in the text). After first remanding the case to 
the Board, the Second Circuit eventually upheld the deportation because of the nine-month 
hiatus between the crimes and their lack of a relation to the original scheme. 394 F.2d at 227. 
39. 926 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1991). 
40. 926 F.2d at 905 (citations omitted). 
41. See DAN KEssELBRENNER & LoRY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES 
§ 6.4 (1994) ("Judicial interpretation of the 'single scheme' phrase has frequently focused on 
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termined through these evidentiary rulings. Courts employing the 
single-plan test have made clear that they will look to various types 
of evidence regarding the nature ang circumstances of the crimes as 
well as the time passing between them to determine whether they 
arose out of a single scheme. As the Ninth Circuit explained in its 
1959 decision, Wood v. Hoy: 
It may be that in some cases the proof of the commission of two 
crimes may by the very nature of the crimes themselves, or the time 
or circumstances of their commission, be reasonable, substantial and 
probative evidence that they did not arise out of a single scheme of 
criminal misconduct.42 
Several courts since Wood have considered the nature, circum-
stances, and timing of the crimes to determine whether they arose 
out of a single scheme. The courts considering this type of circum-
stantial evidence have generally held that the government failed to 
carry its burden where the alien's crimes were similar in nature and 
committed within a short time of each other. For example, in 
Wood, the defendant alien had committed two similar robberies 
with the same three cohorts within three days of each other, and the 
evidence showed that the defendant had agreed with his co-defend-
ants to commit these crimes at one meeting prior to the crimes.43 
The Wood court held that, given the similar nature and circum-
stances of the two crimes and in the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, the government had failed to meet its burden of showing 
that the alien's crimes did not arise out of a single scheme.44 
Similarly in Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS,45 the state of California 
convicted Gonzalez-Sandoval of two bank robberies.46 Because he 
robbed the same bank twice within three days and because he testi-
fied that he conceived of both crimes simultaneously as part of a 
single plan, the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's deportation or-
the issue of evidentiary sufficiency. The introduction of the conviction records alone is not 
necessarily sufficient to meet the government's burden."). The BIA has accepted that the 
government has the burden of proving that the alien's crimes did not arise from a single 
scheme. In re Pataki, 15 I & N 324 (BIA 1975); In re T, 9 I & N 646 (BIA 1962); see also 
Nason, 394 F.2d at 226; Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 1959). 
42. 266 F.2d at 831. The Second Circuit has provided an even more extensive laundry list 
of criteria to be examined: 
[E]vidence of the similarity of two crimes in terms of intent, motive, purpose, tech-
niques, similarity of victims and the like may often be significant on the issue of the 
existence of a "single scheme," especially in serial crimes. Such evidence may establish 
that what appeared at first blush as separate and distinct crimes may, indeed, have been 
spawned by a single criminal scheme. But, it does not have that conclusive significance 
so that it could, by itself, outweigh other overwhelming evidence that the two crimes 
were unrelated. 
Nason, 394 F.2d at 227-28. 
43. Wood, 266 F.2d at 828-29. 
44. Wood, 266 F.2d at 831-32. 
45. 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990). 
46. 910 F.2d at 614. 
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der.47 In the absence of any contrary evidence to rebut Gonzalez-
Sandoval's testimony and the fact that the crimes were within two 
days of each other and directed against the same bank, the court 
held that the government had failed to prove that the crimes did not 
arise out of a single plan.48 
On the other hand, courts applying the single-plan test have 
held that where the nature and circumstances of the alien's crimes 
differ and especially where the crimes are separated by a substantial 
period of time, this evidence alone will satisfy the INS's burden to 
show that the crimes did not arise out of a single scheme. For ex-
ample, in LeToumeur v. INS, 49 where an alien's two robberies in-
volved different companions and different stolen goods, the court 
held that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the gov-
ernment had met its burden to show that the crimes did not arise 
out of a single scheme.so . 
The factor most often used by the government to show the ab-
sence of a single scheme is that a large span of time intervened 
between the two crimes. Such a large time gap has been held to 
carry the government's burden even where the two crimes are simi-
lar in nature. For example, the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
agreed that two fraudulent tax returns filed in two successive years 
presumptively do not arise out of a single scheme.s1 Courts have 
also relied on such large time gaps to overcome both evidence that 
the crimes were similar in nature and the alien's allegation that he 
executed them pursuant to a single plan. For example, in both 
Nason and Leon-Hernandez v. INs,s2 the courts held that the gov-
ernment had met its burden of proof in part due to the long time 
interval between the crimes, despite evidence regarding the similar-
47. Gonzalez-Sandova~ 910 F.2d at 615. 
48. The BIA had found Gonzalez-Sandoval deportable by applying its single-act test, see 
supra section I.B.l, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the deportation order "because the [immi-
gration judge] and the Board applied a legally erroneous test" - the single-act rather than 
the single-plan test. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 910 F.2d at 617. 
49. 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976). 
SO. 538 F.2d at 1371. 
51. Costello v. INS, 311 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1962); Chanan Din Khan v. Barber, 253 F.2d 
547 (9th Cir. 1958). Chanan Din Khan, in fact, articulated as a "presumption" that crimes 
involving somewhat different circumstances and separated by a large amount of time do not 
arise out of a single scheme. See Chanan Din Khan, 253 F.2d at 549-50. Later courts hnve 
referred to this "Chanan presumption" in holding that the INS had met its burden of proof 
by demonstrating such dissimilarities between the alien's crimes. See, e.g., Nason v. INS, 394 
F.2d 223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). In both Chanan and Costello, the alien 
offered no evidence to rebut the presumption created by these facts. Costello, 311 F.2d at 347 
("The acts constituting the commission of these two crimes are separated by a substantial 
interval of time. In the absence of additional facts to support an inference that the two 
crimes [were] related, we think the [immigration judge] was required to find [no single 
scheme]."). 
52. 926 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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ity of the crimes and despite the aliens' contentions that the crimes 
were pursuant to a single plan.53 
3. Mental State During Commission: The Time-to-Reflect Test 
In Pacheco v. INS54 the First Circuit formulated a slightly differ-
ent interpretation of the single scheme exception by focusing exclu-
sively on the time that passes between the two crimes and whether 
this time was sufficient to permit the alien to change her mind 
about her criminal misconduct: 
[A] scheme, to be a "single scheme," must take place at one time; 
there must be no[] substantial interruption that would allow the par-
ticipant to disassociate himself from his enterprise and reflect on what 
he has done .... 
. . . [B]oth the purpose of the statute and the use of the adjective 
"single" point to a temporally integrated episode of continuous activ-
ity. When the immediate activity has ended, even though a 'scheme' 
calls for future activity a participant has his second chance to make a 
decision. He need not further pursue a multistage scheme.55 
The First Circuit's test is similar to the single-plan test in that it 
focuses both on the circumstances of the crime and on the defend-
ant's state of mind. But, under the First Circuit's test, a court looks 
to the defendant's state of mind between the commission of the 
crimes, not before them. If the defendant has sufficient time to 
change her mind, the crimes do not arise out of a single scheme. 
The First Circuit has twice applied this test. In Pacheco, the 
court held that the defendant's two separate acts of attempted bur-
glary against a restaurant and a church within three days did not 
arise out of a single scheme, despite the defendant's arguments that 
the two break-ins resulted from a single prolonged period of drunk-
enness, that the time interval between them was brief, and that his 
technique and companions were the same in both crimes.56 In Ba-
53. Nason, 394 F.2d at 225 {holding that there was no single scheme despite the defend-
ant's contention "that except for the use of a different fictitious name, the crimes in every 
other respect were identical: his intent and purpose were the same, as was his mode of oper-
ation; the merchandise ordered was of a similar type and the victims in both cases were 
publishing houses and various New York department stores."); Leon-Hernandez, 926 F.2d at 
905. 
54. 546 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1976), cerl denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977). 
55. 546 F.2d at 451-52. 
56. 546 F.2d at 451. In rejecting the BIA's single-act-transaction test, Pacheco provided 
another example of a set of facts that would fall within its time-to-reflect test, but not within 
the BIA's test: 
[W]hile "transaction" might cover the generality of cases, such as a bank robbery which 
encompasses an assault on bank employees, we can conceive of more than one separate 
criminal transaction occurring within a short time period and emanating from the same 
enterprise. For example, a bank robbery might involve not only an executable assault 
against bank employees but also other crimes which could occur in the course of the 
escape [such as] theft of a car, assault on a pursuer, reckless driving, and the like. Such, 
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logun v. INS,57 a recent per curiam opinion, an alien's three counts 
of mail fraud were separated by four and twenty-four days. The 
First Circuit held that "petitioner's separate crimes ... occurred on 
widely separated dates. Petitioner had ample opportunity between 
crimes to change direction. Accordingly, his convictions do not 
arise from a 'single scheme'. ... "58 
The First Circuit has also explicitly distinguished the INS's 'sin-
gle-act' test, observing that "[t]he government wishes us to adopt 
the formulation of a 'single transaction.' We think that to equate 
'single scheme' with 'act' or 'transaction' may give insufficient 
scope to the statutory phrase, particularly if these words are nar-
rowly construed."59 
II. UNDERSTANDING CHEVRON 
The previous Part introduced three competing interpretations of 
the single-scheme exception. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have re-
cently provided another way for courts to settle the controversy 
over how to define "a single scheme of criminal misconduct." In 
Iredia v. INS, 60 the Fifth Circuit held that because the meaning of 
the single-scheme exception was ambiguous, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,61 required the court to defer to any reasonable test chosen by 
the BIA. In Nguyen v. INS,62 the Tenth Circuit likewise held that 
Chevron required the court to defer to the BIA's interpretation of 
Section 241's "single scheme."63 
In Chevron, the Supreme Court established a two-step test for 
courts to apply in reviewing the interpretation of a statute by an 
administrative agency. 64 At step one, a reviewing court must deter-
mine whether the statute is ambiguous with regard to the precise 
question at hand - that is, whether the statute evidences a specific 
congressional intent on how to interpret this particular issue.65 If 
we think, might well be deemed part of a single scheme, even though they might also be 
called separate transactions. 
546 F.2d at 451. 
57. 31 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994). 
58. Balogun, 31 F.3d at 9. 
59. Pacheco, 546 F.2d at 451. Interestingly, in Balogun, the First Circuit noted the multi-
circuit split over how to interpret the exception and the argument for Chevron deference to 
the BIA, yet the court tersely stated "petitioner offers no persuasive reason for deviating 
from our own longstanding interpretation and the majority of recent decisions." 31 F.3d at 9. 
60. 981 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1993). 
61. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
62. 991 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1993). 
63. 991 F.2d at 623 ("[W]e adopt [the BIA's] interpretation within the Tenth Circuit after 
giving due deference to the Board pursuant to Chevron •... "(citations omitted)). 
64. 467 U.S. at 842-45. 
65. 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
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the meaning is unambiguous, a court simply applies that clear 
meaning. Second, if the statute is ambiguous, if there is a "gap" in 
the statute on this specific policy question, then Chevron directs the 
courts to defer to the administrative agency's interpretation of the 
statute, so long as that interpretation is "permissible" or "reason-
able. "66 Chevron justified such deference on the grounds that when 
Congress creates an administrative agency, it implicitly authorizes 
the agency to make such gap-filling policy judgments. The Court 
explained that this delegation of policy making power is sensible 
because the agencies are more politically accountable than the 
courts.67 
But the courts that have invoked Chevron to justify deference to 
the BIA's single-act interpretation of the single-scheme exception 
have not rigorously analyzed the issue under either of the two 
Chevron steps. Chevron's step one requires a court to have an idea 
of how it determines a statute is unambiguous. Similarly, step two 
requires an understanding of what types of agency interpretations 
are reasonable or permissible. The courts that have applied Chev-
ron to the single-scheme exception have done so without clearly 
explaining what they envision these two steps to entail and without 
justifying their conclusions at both steps.68 
66. 467 U.S. at 845. 
67. 467 U.S. at 865-66. 
68. For example, in Nguyen v. INS, 991 F.2d 621 {10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit never 
actually stated that the exception was ambiguous at step one or why it was ambiguous. The 
court apparently held that the meaning of the exception was necessarily ambiguous because 
different cases had interpreted it differently; this was the apparent implication of its state-
ments that "[t]he legislative history ... offers no illumination as to congressional intent ... 
and the circuits that have interpreted this language are split." 991 F.2d at 623. Similarly, the 
Iredia court's analysis went as follows: 
Interpretations of ambiguous law by an executive agency are accorded considerable 
weight and deference • 
• . . The cases cited by both sides agree that there is no clear [c]ongressional intent on 
the definition of a "single scheme" of criminal misconduct. Since the legislature has not 
spoken, Chevron directs us to accept the interpretation of the statute by the administra-
tive agency so long as it is reasonable. 
981 F.2d at 848-49 (citations omitted). 
The courts' applications of Chevron's second step to the single-scheme exception have 
provided equally little explanation. In Iredia, the Fifth Circuit provided one justification for 
its summary acceptance of the single-act test as reasonable - not by explaining how the 
single-act interpretation made sense, however, but by crediting the INS's criticism of the rival 
single-plan test. The court held that "[t]he INS in this case gives a convincing account of the 
reasonableness of its interpretation of the word 'scheme' in explaining that 'a focus on the 
pre-planning aspect of criminal activity can lead to theoretical absurdities.'" 981 F.2d at 849. 
The court gave as an example of this absurdity "an alien who is convicted of ten bank robber-
ies [who] cannot be deported ... if he establishes the robberies were all carried out pursuant 
to a plan that he devised prior to executing them." 981 F.2d at 849. The Tenth Circuit's 
analysis of the reasonableness of the BIA's position was even more perfunctory than the 
analysis of the Fifth circuit in Iredia; the Nguyen court cited to lredia and simply stated, "We 
hold that this is a permissible interpretation of the statute." 991 F.2d at 623. Part III of this 
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This Part examines the Supreme Court's Chevron case law to 
explain what courts should do at each of Chevron's two steps. Sec-
tion II.A examines Supreme Court precedents applying Chevron's 
step one and concludes that the case law clearly instructs courts to 
employ a wide variety of traditional tools of statutory construction 
to determine whether a statutory provision is ambiguous. Section 
II.B proposes a theory of judicial review at Chevron's step two. 
This theory incorporates two definitions: first, that an agency's in-
terpretation is "reasonable" only if it does not stretch the ordinary 
meaning of the statutory text too far and is supported by reasoned 
deliberation; and second, that the text and logic of Chevron, as well 
as the cases that come before and after it, all support a multifactor 
analysis of which agency interpretations are "permissible" and 
therefore deserving of deference. 
A. Understanding Step One: How Courts Determine 
if a Statute is Clear 
According to Chevron, the first step in reviewing an agency's 
interpretation of a statute focuses only on the clarity of the congres-
sional intent embodied in the statute. As the Chevron Court stated: 
"First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the ~atter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress. "69 This language suggests that if a statute is clear at step one, 
then there is no interpretation to be done by either the court or the 
agency. The step-one inquiry into whether a statute embodies a 
clear congressional intent raises two questions: What may a court 
examine to determine the clarity of congressional intent? And how 
much clarity is necessary to constitute an "unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress"?70 An examination of the Supreme 
Court's Chevron case law provides rough answers to both 
questions. 
In Chevron itself, the Court advised that judges should use their 
traditional methods of statutory interpretation to determine 
whether a statute embodies a clear congressional intent.71 The 
Court's cases applying Chevron have borne out this description of 
the step-one inquiry. In addition to examining the statute's text, 
Note argues that these courts have misapplied the Chevron rule to the single-scheme 
exception. 
69. 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
70. Or as Justice Scalia phrased this inquiry, "How clear is clear?" See Antonin Scalia, 
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520. 
71. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, 
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is 
the law and must be given effect." (emphasis added)). 
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the Court has frequently looked to a statute's "structure" or to "the 
statute, as a whole" to help find a clear expression of congressional 
intent in one of the statute's particular provisions.12 Also, the 
Court has relied on the legislative history73 and canons of construc-
tion74 to determine the clarity of congressional intent. Thus the 
case law makes clear that the Court's inquiry at step one has devel-
oped into something akin to the conventional judicial search for the 
meaning of a statute by relying on the traditional tools of statutory 
construction.1s But this search for a clear intent differs from con-
ventional statutory interpretation in that the Court is not attempt-
72. See Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 42 (1990) (observing that "the statute, as 
a whole, clearly expresses Congress' intention" (emphasis added)); Bethesda Hosp. Assn. v. 
Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 405 (1988) ("Our conclusion is also supported by the language and 
design of the statute as a whole." (emphasis added)); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 
486 U.S. 107, 121 (1988); ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 514 (1988) ("[T]he 
language, structure, and legislative history of the Act fail to support the petitioners in this 
case .•• " (emphasis added)); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 
112, 124 (1987) ("The words, structure, and history of the LMRA amendments to the NLRA 
clearly reveal" congressional intent (emphasis added)). 
73. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 185 (1991) (Deference is required when "the legis-
lative history is ambiguous and unenlightening on the matters with respect to which the regu-
lations deal ..•. " (emphasis added)); Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. at 115-16 
(1988); ETSI Pipeline Project, 484 U.S. at 514 ("[T]he language, structure, and legislative 
history of the Act fail to support the petitioner in this case ... "(emphasis added)); United 
Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. at 124 ("The words, structure, and history of 
the LMRA amendments to the NLRA clearly reveal" congressional intent. (emphasis ad-
ded}); Chemical Mfrs. Assn. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985) (Deference is required "un-
less the legislative history or the purpose and structure of the statute clearly reveal a contrary 
intent" (emphasis added)). 
74. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Assn., 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991) 
("When a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a 
reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration."); Dole, 494 U.S. at 36 ("The 
traditional canon of construction, noscitur a sociis, dictates that 'words grouped in a list 
should be given related meaning.'" (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114-15 
(1989))); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (stating a presumption 
against retroactive rulemaking); DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a 
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to 
avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."). 
75. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647 (1990); R~gents of 
Univ. of cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 603 (1988) (White, J., con-
curring); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. at 123 ("On a pure question of 
statutory construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using 'tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction.' If we can do so, then that interpretation must be given 
effect, and the regulations at issue must be fully consistent with it." (quoting INS v. Cardozo-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987))); Chemical Mfrs. Assn. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 152 (1985) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Chevron's deference requirement, however, was explicitly limited 
to cases in which congressional intent cannot be discerned through the use of the traditional 
techniques of statutory interpretation."); see also Erika Jones et al., Developments in Judicial 
Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the Agency, 4 AoMIN. 
LJ. 113, 124-25 (1990) (In which Judge Stephen Williams observed that "it is clear from 
Chevron itself that 'directly' does not exclude consideration of legislative history. And as to 
Congress's speaking to the 'precise question,' Chevron makes it clear that congressional as-
sertions of policy values, even though not addressed directly to the issue before the court, 
play an important role ••.. " (footnote omitted)). 
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ing to discover the best reading of a statutory provision, but whether 
the statutory provision evidences a clear intent. 
It remains uncertain exactly how much clarity is necessary for a 
statute to satisfy step one, because the Court has described this in-
quiry in a variety of ways. Although Chevron required a court to 
find that a statute "clearly" showed that Congress "had an intention 
on the precise question at issue" in order to find a statute unambigu-
ous,76 subsequent opinions have reformulated this requirement to 
demand a less exacting expression of congressional intent. The 
Court has asked merely whether the statute is "ambiguous" or "un-
clear,"77 or whether the statute has a "plain meaning."78 Rather 
than rejecting deference, as Chevron did, by holding that a statute 
displays a clear congressional intent on the precise question in dis-
pute, subsequent opinions have rejected deference because the 
agency's interpretation was "strained" and "inconsistent" with the 
statute's "express language;"79 because the agency's view was not 
an "accurate or reasonable interpretation" of the statute;8° because 
a "common sense" or "natural reading" of the statute was contrary 
to the agency's interpretation;81 or because an agency's interpreta-
tion was "at odds with the plain language of the statute itself."82 
The trend thus seems to be toward finding that if one reading of 
the statute is clearly the most plausible candidate, then the statute is 
clear. Commentators have confirmed that in applying such a stan-
dard, courts more readily find statutory clarity at step one. For ex-
ample, Professor Cass Sunstein has observed that in many cases the 
Supreme Court has held that congressional intent is clear even 
though the statute is sufficiently ambiguous to permit several plau-
sible readings.83 Such opinions often generate stinging dissents that 
invoke Chevron's deference rule.84 As a consequence of opening 
76. Chevron, 461 U.S. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added). 
77. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing S.E. Inc. v. United Distrib. Cos., 498 
U.S. 211, 223 (1991}; Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988}; Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 
488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988); Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 980·81 (1986). 
78. See, e.g., Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991} (rejecting deference to 
administrative interpretation contrary to statute's plain language); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 
U.S. 478, 482-83 (1990) (deferring to agency interpretation compelled by statute's plain 
meaning); Public Employment Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989} ("[N]o def-
erence is due to agency interpretations at odds with the plain language of the statute itself."), 
79. Bethesda Hosp. Assn. v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 404 (1988). 
80. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 
368 (1986). 
81. Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990). 
82. Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989). 
83. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 
2071, 2085 (1990) (citing as examples Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26 (1990}; Pitt-
ston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988); and Connecticut Department of Income 
Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985)). 
84. See Sunstein, supra note 83, at 2085. 
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up the inquiry at step one to include a wide range of traditional 
methods of statutory interpretation, the Court has made it easier to 
find a sufficiently clear intent in statutes to reject deference to the 
agency's interpretations. It would seem to require a great deal of 
ambiguity to fail Chevron's first step.85 
B. Understanding Step Two: When an Agency Interpretation is 
Unreasonable or Impermissible 
The second step of the Chevron test has been the agency-
friendly branch of the Chevron case law. From 1984 through 1992, 
the Supreme Court affirmed every agency interpretation that made 
it to step two.86 Recently, however, the Court has begun to reject 
agency interpretations as unacceptable at Chevron's second step.87 
Overall, there has been little explicit guidance from the Courtss as 
to how courts should structure their application of Chevron's step 
85. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 
991 (1992) (The step·one "inquiry has tended in practice to devolve into an inquiry about 
whether the statute as a whole generates a clearly preferred meaning. [This] movement from 
'specific intention'-to 'plain meaning' to 'plain meaning considering the design of the statute 
as a whole' is but one short step away from 'best meaning.' In other words ... the Court has 
moved the [step-one] inquiry a long way toward the exercise of independent judgment.''); 
Sunstein, supra note 83, at 2091 ("The Court's own decisions ... suggest that the mere fact of 
a plausible alternative view is insufficient to trigger the Chevron [deference] rule.''). 
In a law review article, Justice Scalia also observed that his method of statutory interpre-
tation will often find that statutes have a clear meaning: "One who finds more often (as I do) 
that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other 
laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It 
is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though 
reasonable, I would not personally adopt." Scalia, supra note 70, at 521. 
86. Professor Merrill has examined the rationales behind all of the Supreme Court's 
Chevron cases. His exhaustive analyses show that until recently whenever the Court rejected 
an agency interpretation, it always did so at step one. Merrill, supra note 85, at 1034-38; 
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 
351, 376-77 (1994). At least one commentator has argued that the behavior of lower courts 
has been similar. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Deci-
sionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 83, 96 (1994) 
("Regardless of whether a reviewing court is deferential or active, once it reaches step two it 
rarely reverses an agency interpretation as unreasonable.''). 
87. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing recent Supreme Court prece-
dents rejecting agency interpretations at Chevron's step two). 
88. See Merrill, supra note 85, at 993 (observing that "the Court has not given much 
consideration to step two at any time throughout the post-Chevron period ... [and] the 
frequency declined even further between the earlier and later periods"); Sunstein, supra note 
83, at 2104 ("The Supreme Court has given little explicit guidance for determining when 
interpretations will be found reasonable. In most of the cases rejecting an agency's view, the 
Court has relied on the first step of Chevron, finding an explicit congressional decision on the 
point.''). In a panel discussion, Judge Stephen F. Williams questioned whether step two of-
fered any restriction on an agency's interpretations: "When would an agency fail [the step-
two] test? Only when it would flunk the laugh t~st at the Kennedy School of Public Policy?" 
Jones et al., supra note 75, at 124. But see infra section 11.B.1-2 (mining the Supreme Court's 
case law for relevant factors to be considered at step two). 
1124 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:1105 
two to determine when an agency,s interpretation is unreasonable 
or impermissible.89 
This section, however, suggests a theory of judicial review at 
Chevron's step two, by building on the text and logic of the Chev-
ron opinion and on a careful review of the Supreme Coures other 
precedents regarding judicial deference to agency interpretations of 
statutes. Section II.B.1 argues that an interpretation is "unreasona-
ble,, if it strays too far from the natural meaning of the words used 
in the statutory text and if it is not supported by reasoned delibera-
tion. Section Il.B.2 argues that "permissible,, interpretations only 
include those readings supported by Chevron's rationales for defer-
ence. This section argues that Chevron itself, as well as other 
Supreme Court case law, indicate that courts should look to factors 
like agency expertise and consistency of interpretation to determine 
whether Congress intended courts to defer to the agency interpreta-
tion at issue. 
1. Reasonableness 
The starting point for the step-two inquiry remains the statutory 
text. The court has already scrutinized the text alone and found 
that it does not display a sufficiently clear congressional intent to 
establish authoritatively one particular interpretation. At step two, 
the court proceeds to compare the most ordinary and natural mean-
ing of the text to the interpretation advanced by the administrative 
agency. The statutory text thus acts as a continuing constraint on 
an agency,s interpretive discretion at step two. "Reasonableness,, 
thus requires an agency interpretation to be properly within its del-
egated policymaking power because the statute,s text embodies the 
boundaries of the agency,s policymaking discretion as established 
by Congress. Without this constraint, an agency could interpret 
statutes in ways utterly at odds with the congressional intent em-
bodied in the statute,s text. Courts reviewing agency interpreta-
tions of ambiguous statutes at Chevron's step two should apply its 
reasonableness requirement to enforce the boundaries represented 
by an even ambiguous statutory text to maintain the agency,s fidel-
ity to congressional will.90 
89. Chevron described the types of agency interpretations that would fail at step two 
alternatively-using the terms unreasonable and impermissible without providing any in-
dependent content to either term. See Chevron, 461 U.S. at 866. This section, however, 
proposes a standard of judicial review at step two that gives independent meaning to each 
term. 
90. In fact, the Supreme Court's delegation doctrine requires that Congress provide an 
"intelligible principle" in statutes that delegate policymaking power to administrative agen-
cies. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); J.W. Hampton. Jr. & Co. v. 
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Recent Supreme Court cases that have rejected agency interpre-
tations at step two support this understanding of even ambiguous 
statutes as providing boundaries on an agency's discretion. For ex-
ample, in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust 
& Savings Bank,91 the Court rejected an agency's request for Chev-
ron deference because "[b]y reading the words 'to the extent' to 
mean nothing more than 'if,' the Department has exceeded the 
scope of available ambiguity."92 Similarly, in City of Chicago v. En-
vironmental Defense Fund,93 the Court rejected an agency's argu-
ment for Chevron deference because "the [agency's] interpretation 
... goes beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity [the statute] con-
tains .... [The statutory provision] simply cannot be read to con-
tain the [agency's interpretation]."94 
Also, an agency interpretation is "reasonable" only if the agency 
explains its interpretation of a statute in a rational and sensible way. 
Assuring that agencies engage in reasoned deliberation is a tradi-
tional justification for judicial review of agency action.9s Moreover, 
this component of the step two inquiry is supported by both Chev-
ron and the cases preceding it. In holding that the EPA's construc-
tion of the Clean Air Act passed step two, the Chevron Court 
justified this conclusion in part by observing that the "agency con-
sidered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion. "96 This re-
quirement that agency interpretations be well-reasoned to merit 
deference from a reviewing court was a common factor that courts 
considered in reviewing agencies' statutory interpretations before 
Chevron. The best-known statement of this principle came in Skid-
more v. Swift & Co.,rn in which the Court held that the degree of 
deference a court should give to an agency's interpretation de-
United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). The concept of "reasonableness" explained in the text 
merely requires that agencies stay within such principles even to the extent they are some-
what ambiguous. 
91. 114 s. Ct. 517 (1993). 
92. 114 S. Ct. at 531. 
93. 114 s. Ct. 1588 (1993). 
94. 114 S. Ct. at 1574. 
95. See generally Louis LEVENTHAL JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE Ae-
noN (1965). One scholar has recently argued that courts should ensure that agencies engage 
in reasoned decisionmaking as the predominant value in applying Chevron. See Seidenfeld, 
supra note 86. 
96. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
The Court explicitly relied on the agency's reasoned deliberation as one of three reasons 
(along with the fact that the statute involved a technical policy issue and that the interpreta-
tion required the reconciliation of competing policy objectives) for its holding that the ambig-
uous statutory provision satisfied step two: "In these cases, the Administrator's 
interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and 
is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency consid-
ered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling 
conflicting policies." 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted). 
97. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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pended on "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the valid-
ity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to per-
suade, if lacking power to control."98 
2. Permissibility 
If an agency's interpretation of a statute is reasonable, courts 
must next look to whether Chevron's rationale for deference ap-
plies. Chevron justifies its presumption of deference to agency in-
terpretations on the rationale that Congress implicitly delegates 
interpretive authority to an agency because the agency is a better 
policymaker in the face of statutory ambiguity than a court.99 The 
Supreme Court's cases both before and after Chevron have consist-
ently looked to two additional factors to help determine when an 
agency interpretation is probably the result of a legislative delega-
tion of policymaking power and thus deserves deference: the pres-
ence of a particular agency expertise and agency interpretations 
that are longstanding and consistent. · 
The importance of technical expertise as a factor that legiti-
mates an agency's interpretation at step two is evident from the 
98. 323 U.S. at 140, quoted in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 
n5 (1978); see also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 
401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971); Merrill, supra note 85, at 972-74 ("[I]n deciding what degree of 
deference to give an executive interpretation, the Court [before Chevron] relied on an eclec-
tic cluster of considerations .••. [One factor] was that interpretations supported by a rea-
soned analysis were entitled to deference."). 
99. Chevron, 461 U.S. at 844-45 ("Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a 
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. •.• ['The agency decision] here is a reason-
able policy choice for the agency to make."). As the Court explained: 
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, 
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely U(>On the incumbent administration's 
views of wise policy to inform its judgments .... LI]t is entirely appropriate for [the 
Executive Branch] to make such policy choices - resolving the competing interests 
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be re-
solved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities. 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision .•• really centers 
on the wisdom of the agency's policy ••• the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal 
judges - who have no constituency - have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices 
made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy 
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not 
judicial ones •••• 
467 U.S. at 865-66; see also Jones et al. supra note 75, at 130 (In which Judge Williams ob-
served that "[Chevron] reminds us that where the texts provide no serious guidance, 'inter-
pretation' is really policy choice, and that this belongs with the politically responsible."); 
Richard J. Pierce, Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of 
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301, 305-07 (1988) ("When a court 'interprets' impre-
cise, ambiguous, or conflicting statutory language in a particular manner, the court is resolv-
ing a policy issue ..•. Like a court, an agency frequently makes policy when it interprets 
ambiguous or imprecise terms in the statute that grants the agency its legal powers .••• Once 
a court realizes that it is reviewing an agency's resolution of a policy issue ..• comparative 
institutional analysis demonstrates that the agency is a more appropriate institution than a 
court to resolve the controversy."). 
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Chevron opinion itself. In Chevron, the Court held that the EPA's 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act satisfied step two in part be-
cause it involved a "regulatory scheme [that] is technical and com-
plex .... "1°0 This focus on technical expertise has much support in 
the history of Supreme Court precedents according deference to 
agency interpretations of statutes.101 
Similarly, the importance of an agency's longstanding and con-
sistent interpretation of a statute was regularly considered in the 
Supreme Court's cases before Chevron.102 Moreover, this factor 
has been perhaps the most frequently cited justification since Chev-
ron, supporting the Court's approval of agency interpretations at 
step two.103 In a 1993 case, the Court explicitly stated the impor-
tance of this factor in affecting the rigor of judicial review at step 
two: "[T]he consistency of an agency's position is a factor in assess-
ing the weight that position is due. As we have stated, '[a]n agency 
interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the 
agency's earlier interpretation is 'entitled to considerably less defer-
ence' than a consistently held agency view.' "104 Thus this Note of-
fers a theory of Chevron's step two that instructs courts to look at 
four factors: the extent to which the agency interpretation stretches 
100. 467 U.S. at 865; see supra note 96 (full quote). Moreover, in explaining the rule, the 
Chevron Court observed that "the principle of deference to administrative interpretations 
'has been consistently followed by this Court whenever .•• a full understanding of the force 
of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowl-
edge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations."' 467 U.S. at 844 (emphasis 
added). The Court explicitly contrasted agencies with the courts, observing that in special-
ized administrative areas, "Judges are not experts in the field." 467 U.S. at 865. 
101. This is true for cases coming both before and after Chevron. See Aluminum Co. of 
Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., ·467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984); E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.25 (1977); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 
382 (1961); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1958). Cases after Chevron 
in which the Court has observed the importance of agency expertise in accepting the agency's 
interpretation of a statute include Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680 (1991); 
Litton Fmancial Printing Division v. NLRB, 501U.S.190 (1991); and Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
102. See United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. i80, 291 
(1981); Watt v. Alaska, 451U.S.259, 272-73 (1981); General Elec. Co. v. Gilert, 429 U.S. 125, 
143 (1976); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974). 
103. See, e.g., California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 499 (1990) (referring to "the deference 
this Court must accord to long-standing and well-entrenched decisions, especially those inter-
preting statutes that underlie complex regulatory regimes" (emphasis added)); NLRB v. 
United Food & Commercial Workers' Union, 484 U.S. 112, 124 n.20 (1987). 
Moreover, in at least one instance, the Court has explicitly rejected deference to the BIA, 
in part because of the inconsistent interpretations it had taken over the years. See INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 ("An additional reason for rejecting the INS's re-
quest for heightened deference to its position is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA 
has taken through the years."); see infra section III.B.2 (arguing that the BIA's interpretation 
of the single-scheme exception merits less deference because of the inconsistent ways it has 
interpreted the exception). 
104. Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. a. 2151, 2161 (1993) (quoting INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 
(1981)) (emphasis added)). 
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too far from the statutory text, the agency's reasoning, the presence 
of agency expertise, and how longstanding and consistent the 
agency's interpretation has been. Such a multi-factor approach at 
step two is supported by the Supreme Court's cases predating Chev-
ron, by Chevron itself, and by the cases since Chevron.1os 
ill. APPLYING CHEVRONTO THE SINGLE-SCHEME EXCEPTION 
This Part takes the understanding of Chevron developed in Part 
II and applies it to the controversy over the proper definition of the 
single-scheme exception, concluding that courts should reject the 
BIA's single-act test. It provides two alternative arguments to 
reach this conclusion. Section III.A argues that the text of the sin-
gle-scheme exception embodies a clear congressional intent to ap-
ply the single-plan test. Section III.B then argues that, even if the 
105. Before Chevron, the Supreme Court lacked a single doctrine that governed how 
courts should review agencies' statutory interpretations. See Merrill, supra note 85, at 972. 
Instead courts engaged in a case-by.case determination of when to defer to a given agency 
and when not to defer. In 1976, Judge Henry Friendly described the ad hoc character of the 
case law, observing that "two lines of Supreme Court decisions on this subject .•• are analyti-
cally in conflict . • . • Leading cases support[] the view that great deference must be given to 
the decisions of an administrative agency applying a statute •••• However, there is [also] an 
impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of judicial for administrative judgment" 
on questions of statutory interpretation. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 
F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), affd. sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 
249 (1977). 
In making these ad hoc determinations, courts relied on a whole host of considerations, 
which commentators later referred to as "deference factors." See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 85, 
at 972-75; Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring The Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 986 (1987). For example, deference to an agency 
was generally more appropriate if the issue involved an agency's particular technical exper-
tise or if the agency had held the same interpretation for a long time. See supra notes 101-03 
and accompanying text. Although courts often relied on these deference factors before 
Chevron, their role in the post-Chevron era is a matter of hot debate among commentators. 
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALB J. ON REo. 283, 
299 (1985) (In which then-Judge Starr opined that one of the leading "unresolved issues" 
after Chevron is whether "any of the [traditionally significant] factors ••• are still relevant."). 
They have never been explicitly incorporated into Chevron's two-part test, and Justice Scalia, 
for one, has argued that such factors are now irrelevant to a court's decision whether to defer 
because Chevron replaced the multi-factor decision on deference with a broad presumption 
that courts must defer to an agency's statutory interpretations unless deference is inappropri-
ate under either of Chevron's two steps. See Scalia, supra note 70, at 517, 521 (arguing that 
under Chevron, "there is no longer any justification for giving 'special' deference to 'long-
standing and consistent' agency interpretations of law •••• [T]hose concepts are no longer 
relevant, or no longer relevant in the same way."). Justice Breyer, on the other hand, in an 
article written when he was an appellate judge, explicitly counseled in favor of continuing use 
of these "deference factors," as a guide to when to defer to an agency's view. Stephen 
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L REv. 363, 373, 382 
(1986) ("Despite its attractive simplicity, [the Chevron approach] seems unlikely in the long 
run, to replace the complex [deference factor] approach •.•• [P]ressures ••. will tend to build 
a jurisprudence of 'degree and difference' into Chevron's word 'permissible.' "). This debate 
appears to have been resolved by the Supreme Court's case law. The factors have not disap-
peared from Supreme Court opinions in the Chevron era, but rather the Court continues to 
cite to them as reasons for its deference decisions. See Merrill, supra note 85, at 980-85; infra 
notes 130-141 and accompanying text. 
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exception does not demonstrate that Congress clearly intended to 
apply the single-plan test, courts should reject the BIA's single-act 
test as an unreasonable and impermissible reading of the statute. 
A. Step One Applied to the Single-Scheme Exception 
Section II.A concluded that a court can use its traditional tools 
of statutory construction at Chevron's step one in determining 
whether a statutory provision is ambiguous. A broad inquiry em-
ploying these tools indicates that the single-scheme exception 
clearly embraces the single-plan test. Specifically, the statutory 
text's plain meaning and an established canon of construction in 
immigration law seem to require that courts adopt the single-plan 
test. 
1. The Ordinary Meaning of "Scheme" 
The word scheme has a natural and ordinary meaning. A 
scheme is a plan, and especially a plan that involves a coherent set 
of related parts. The American Heritage Dictionary defines a 
"scheme" as 
1. A systematic plan of action. 2. An orderly combination of related 
parts or elements. 3. A plan, esp. a secret or devious one; plot. 4. A 
chart, diagram, or outline of a system or object. 5. A visionary 
plan.106 
Thus the natural and ordinary meaning of scheme combines two 
ideas. The primary idea is of a conscious plan or design. Such a 
plan or design requires a certain forward-looking conceptual state 
of mind on the part of the planner. The second idea is that this 
design involves related, coherent parts that are systematic and or-
106 . .AMERICAN HERITAGE D1cnoNARY 1097 (2d ed. 1985) (emphasis added); see also 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S CoLLEGIATE D1cnoNARY 1044 (10th ed.1993) (defining scheme as "l 
a archaic (1 ): a mathematical or astronomical diagram (2): a representation of the astrologi-
cal aspects of the planets at a particular time b: a graphic sketch or outline 2: a concise 
statement or table: EPITOME 3: a plan or program of action; esp: a crafty or secret one 4: 
a systematic or organized framework: DESIGN syn see PLAN" (emphasis added)); 
RooET's II THE NEW THESAURUS 866 (1988) (giving synonyms for scheme: 1. A method for 
making, doing, or accomplishing something. 1. DESIGN ..• 2. A secret plan to achieve an 
evil or illegal end. 2. PLOT"); WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE THESAURUS 705 (1976) (giving syno-
nyms for scheme: "1 syn PLAN 1, blueprint, design, game plan, project, strategy •.. 2 syn 
PLOT 2, cabal, conspiracy, covin, intrigue, machination, practice"); WEBSTER'S II NEW RIV-
ERSIDE UNIVERSITY D1cnoNARY 1044 (1984) (defining scheme as "1. A systematic plan of 
action. 2. An orderly combination of related or successive parts or elements: SYSTEM. 3. A 
plan, esp. a secret or underhand one: PLOT. 4. A chart, diagram, or outline of a system or 
object 5. A visionary plan." (emphasis added)). 
The Supreme Court has often sanctioned the use of dictionaries as an effort to get at the 
natural and plain meaning of statutory text. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 86, at 355-57 
(citing nine Supreme Court cases that relied on dictionaries in 1988 and 22 cases in 1992 and 
observing "a rise in the use of dictionaries" by the Supreme Court); see also A. Raymond 
Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. 
& Pun. PoLY. 71 (1994); Note, Looking It Up: The Use of Dictionaries in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994). 
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derly, like a chart or diagram. These two ideas combine into a 
scheme when the related parts cohere because of a conscious design 
or plan. The ordinary and natural meaning of "single scheme of 
criminal misconduct" therefore is a plan, plot, or design to commit 
a coherent set of related crimes. The single-plan interpretation of 
"single scheme of criminal misconduct" accurately embodies the 
statute's natural and ordinary meaning, by focusing on whether the 
alien planned the crimes and executed those crimes as the related 
parts of one systematic plan or plot.101 
2. A Canon of Construction 
In addition to the statute's natural meaning, a traditional canon 
of statutory construction supports finding that the single-scheme ex-
ception clearly embodies the single-plan test. The Supreme Court 
has established a customary rule on how to interpret deportation 
laws. The Court has held that courts should read deportation stat-
utes quite narrowly and resolve all doubts in favor of the alien. The 
Court explained that 
deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banish-
ment or exile . . . . [S]ince the stakes are considerable for the individ-
ual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom 
beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible 
meanings of the words used.1os 
This traditional rule of interpretation supports the single-plan 
test because that test reads the exception in the way most generous 
to aliens. The BIA's single-act test, on the other hand, least pro-
tects the interests of aliens by nearly reading the exception out of 
the statute - applying it only in the extremely rare circumstances 
when the alien's crimes result from a single physical act. Similarly 
the First Circuit's time-to-reflect test is generally less generous to 
aliens because it requires a very short time span between the 
crimes. The BIA, in fact, has criticized the single-plan test as being 
too generous to aliens because it "would allow for criminals to com-
mit numerous similar crimes over a period of time, but still avoid 
deportability ... ,"109 The Supreme Court, however, has made clear 
107. Similarly, the idea of a scheme in criminal law involves conscious design on the part 
of the criminal. See FED. R. C!uM. P. 8(a}, which permits separate offenses to be joined in a 
single trial so long as they occur pursuant to a common scheme). Otherwise, the Rule does 
not permit separate offenses to be joined out of concern that juries will cumulate evidence; 
see also WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, C!uMINAL PROCEDURE§ 17.l(a) (2d ed. 
1992) which discusses case law defining "common scheme". 
108. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (emphasis added). In a 1987 decision 
that rejected Chevron deference to the BIA, the Supreme Court approvingly cited the Fong 
Haw Tan canon as a "longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in depor-
tation statutes in favor of the alien," although the Court did not rely on the canon. INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987). 
109. In re Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992WL195812, at *5 (BIA May 221992). 
March 1995) Note-Single-Scheme Exception and Chevron 1131 
that immigration statutes should be interpreted wherever possible 
to avoid deportability. The single-plan test is thus consistent with 
the Supreme Court's interpretive presumption regarding the con-
gressional intent embodied in the deportation laws.110 
Some courts and the INS, however, have rejected the single-
plan test by invoking the canon that requires avoiding statutory in-
terpretations that lead to "absurd results."111 These courts suggest 
that the single-plan test in practice would lead to "theoretical ab-
surdities," such as permitting an alien who committed multiple rob-
beries to avoid deportation simply by alleging that the robberies 
were all carried out pursuant to a prior plan.112 The experiences of 
courts that have applied the single-plan test, however, belie this al-
legation of its possible absurd consequences. Although the single-
plan test may be more generous to aliens than the BIA's test, it 
does not necessarily provide an effortless way for convicted aliens 
to avoid deportation. Single-plan courts have defined plan strictly 
to require a close relationship between the crimes, have required 
that evidence factually support an alien's contention of a single 
plan, and have allowed the INS to establish a presumption of no 
single plan where the facts show that such a plan is unlikely.113 For 
example, courts have presumed that no single plan existed when the 
crimes were separated by a significant amount of time. The Wood 
110. A plausible argument can be made that courts cannot use canons to determine that 
the meaning of a statute is clear at Chevron's step one, because courts only employ canons 
when the meaning of a statutory text is ambiguous. But the Fong Haw Tan canon can be 
employed at step one as a guide to congressional intent, which is how the Supreme Court 
articulated it: "[W)e will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond 
that which is required .... " Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10. Because the goal of Chevron's 
first step is to determine the clarity of congressional intent, a court should employ all guides 
to congressional intent. Cf. Merrill, supra note 85, at 988 (observing that "the canons clearly 
qualify as a 'traditional tool of statutory construction' "but also acknowledging the argument 
above). At least one commentator has argued that a canon very similar to the Fong Haw Tan 
canon should continue to be applied as consistent with Chevron. See Note, Chevron and the 
Canon Concerning Indians, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 1015, 1022 (1993) (arguing that "[b)efore 
applying a canon, a court should determine if its application is consistent with the Court's 
post·Chevron presumptions concerning congressional intent" and concluding that the canon 
requiring statutes to be interpreted favorably to Indians should continue to be applied); see 
also Denise W. DeFranco, Note, Chevron and Canons of Statutory Construction, 58 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 829 (1990). 
The Fong Haw Tan canon may also be a particularly strong guide to congressional intent 
regarding the single·scheme exception because Fong Haw Tan was decided in 1948 - four 
years before the Congress that adopted the 1952 legislation containing the single-scheme 
exception. Moreover, the Fong Haw Tan Court was construing language that, like § 241, 
restricted the category of aliens otherwise deportable. Therefore, it is likely that the 1952. 
Congress understood the manner in which the courts would construe the single-scheme ex-
ception in the new immigration statute. 
111. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-60 (1892). 
112. Iredia v. INS, 981 F.2d 847, 849 {5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 203 (1993). 
113. See supra note 51 {discussing the case law in which single-plan courts created "the 
·Chanan presumption" that allows the government to meet its burden of proof by showing 
that the alien's crimes are separated by a long time interval or are otherwise unrelated). 
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court explained that in some cases the government can meet its bur-
den to show no single scheme merely by pointing to certain facts: 
It may be that in some cases the proof of the commission of two 
crimes may by the very nature of the crimes themselves, or the time 
or circumstances of their commission, be reasonable, substantial and 
probative evidence that they did not arise out of a single scheme of 
criminal misconduct.114 
In several cases, single-plan courts have upheld deportation or-
ders despite an alien's contention that his crimes arose out of a sin-
gle scheme. For example, in both Nason v. INS11S and Leon-
Hemandez v. INS, 116 the courts held that the government had met 
its burden of proof in part due to the long time interval between the 
crimes, despite evidence regarding the similarity of the crimes and 
despite the aliens' contentions that the crimes were pursuant to a 
single plan.117 Similarly, in Chanan Din Khan v. Barber,11s where 
the alien had been convicted of two counts of willfully evading in-
come taxes for two consecutive years, the court held that because 
the alien had not produced sufficient evidence of a single scheme, 
his bare contention that there was a scheme was inadequate. 
The single-plan test thus requires immigration judges and the 
BIA to look at all the circumstances surrounding the crimes and to 
make a factual :finding whether the crimes actually arose out of a 
single scheme of criminal misconduct. While such :findings are open 
to all the problems inherent in trying to determine what actually 
happened after the fact, such a test does not necessarily lead to 
"theoretical absurdities." 
Nor have the courts applying the single-plan test hobbled INS 
enforcement efforts. Under the single-plan test, the INS clearly can 
institute deportation against aliens who commit crimes that appear 
prima facie unrelated or are separated by such a long time interval 
that it is unlikely that the crimes were part of a single plan. In these 
cases, the burden then effectively shifts to the defendant alien to 
produce some evidence of a plan, and the immigration judge can 
evaluate the credibility and persuasiveness of such evidence.119 
B. Step Two Applied to the Single-Scheme Exception 
Even though the single-plan test appears to capture the natural 
and ordinary meaning of the single-scheme exception, one could 
114. Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 1959). 
115. 394 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). 
116. 926 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1991). 
117. Nason, 394 F.2d at 227; Leon-Hernandez, 926 F.2d at 904-05. 
118. 253 F.2d 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 920 (1958). 
119. See generally note 51 (describing how the courts created the Chanan presumption, 
permitting the INS to meet its burden of proof in such cases). 
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argue that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not express a 
clear congressional intent on this precise issue because the phrase is 
not defined by the statute, nor does the legislative history tell us 
how to define it.120 A court taking this approach would then have 
to move on to Chevron's step two and defer to any reasonable BIA 
interpretation of this ambiguous language. This section argues, 
however, that courts should reject the BIA's single-act interpreta-
tion of the single-scheme exception as an unreasonable and imper-
missible interpretation of the immigration statute. Section III.B.1 
compares the statutory text to the BIA's interpretation to conclude 
that the BIA's view is not "reasonable," because it embodies a 
highly strained reading of the statute and because the BIA has not 
provided any detailed reasoning to support such a strained reading. 
Section ill.B.2 then argues that the BIA's interpretation also does 
not merit judicial deference as a "permissible" reading of the 
statute. 
1. Why the BIA's Reading is Unreasonable 
The BIA's single-act interpretation of the single-scheme excep-
tion embodies a strained and insufficiently reasoned reading of the 
statute. First, the BIA's test belies the natural and ordinary mean-
ing of the statutory text, focusing instead on whether the crimes are 
part of a single physical act. Even if scheme does not clearly mean 
plan, it surely does not mean act. 121 As the Ninth Circuit has 
explained: 
[T]his is not what the statute says. The Board of Immigration Ap-
peals ... has applied the statute as if it read "single criminal act." 
We must take the language of the statute as we find it. It says "not 
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct"; it does not say 
"not arising out of a single criminal act." If such latter reading had 
been the intent of Congress they could have so declared.122 
Other courts have agreed. For example, the First Circuit reasoned 
that "to equate 'single scheme' with 'act' or 'transaction' may give 
insufficient scope to the statutory phrase, particularly if these words 
are narrowly construed. As other courts have noted, the Congress 
120. This language is thus arguably ambiguous for the same reason that the language 
"stationary source" was ambiguous in Chevron. See also supra notes 76·85 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the uncertainty over what qualifies as sufficiently ambiguous to trigger 
step two under Chevron.). 
121. As discussed above, dictionaries and thesauri demonstrate that the plain and ordi-
nary meaning of scheme is a "plan" or a "design" or a "system." See supra section III.A.1. 
None of these sources, however, equated the word scheme with the words act or episode. 
Although the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held the BIA's single·act interpretation of the 
single·scheme exception to be reasonable, see supra notes 60·63 and accompanying text, 
neither provided rigorous analysis of the BIA's view, see supra note 68, and the Fifth Circuit 
later expressed doubt about the wisdom of its previous decision, see supra note 16. 
122. Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 1959) (footnote omitted). 
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could have chosen more precise words. "123 And the Second Circuit 
declared that "[t]he statutory language, 'a single scheme of criminal 
misconduct,' is not so narrow as a single criminal act or transac-
tion. "124 Thus even if the statutory term scheme is somewhat am-
biguous, the BIA's "interpretation . . . goes beyond the scope of 
whatever ambiguity [the statute] contains."125 
Additionally, the BIA has not "considered the matter in [the 
kind of] detailed and reasoned fashion"126 that merits judicial def-
erence. The BIA has offered no justification for equating the words 
scheme and act or for ignoring the plain and natural meaning of the 
statutory text.121 Nor has the BIA offered any reason to ignore the 
canon articulated in the Supreme Court's Fong Haw Tan case that 
presumes Congress intends a restrictive reading of deportation pro-
visions.128 Finally, the BIA's argument that the single-plan test 
would lead to "theoretical absurdities" is belied by the experiences 
of the courts applying the single-plan test and the nuances of the 
test that single-plan courts have developed to accommodate the 
practical realities of deportation enforcement.129 
2. Why the BIA's Interpretation is Impermissible 
Perhaps the most persuasive reason that courts have tradition-
ally cited in deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute is 
the presence of a highly complicated question calling on an agency's 
special expertise, 13° but this rationale for deference is inapplicable 
to the single-scheme exception. This attention to expertise reflects 
Congress's understandable desire to refer questions to the institu-
tion - whether a court or an agency - with the most competence 
to answer the question. But the definition of the single-scheme ex-
ception does not seem to call on the particular technical compe-
tence of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Rather, divining what 
Congress meant by "scheme" seems to fall more comfortably within 
the courts' specialized skills of both statutory construction and eval-
uating criminal behavior. 
The other traditional deference factor most often cited by courts 
. as a reason to accord an agency deference - the longstanding and 
123. Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448, 451 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977). 
124. Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). 
125. Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1594 (1994) (rejecting an 
agency's argument for Chevron deference because "the [agency's] interpretation ••• goes 
beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity [the statute] contains"). 
126. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
127. See supra note 68. 
128. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text. 
130. Indeed, such a question of expertise was involved in Chevron itself, as was explicitly 
noted by the Court. 467 U.S. at 865. 
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consistent character of an agency's view131 - is similarly inapplica-
ble to interpreting the single-scheme exception. This factor might 
seem to weigh in the BIA's favor because the Board has referred to 
the Adetiba test as its "historic approach."132 Nevertheless, an ex-
amination of the BIA case law reveals that the Board has actually 
interpreted the single-scheme exception in a variety of ways.133 
Although consistently rejecting the single-plan approach,134 the 
BIA has formulated its interpretation of "single scheme" in lan-
guage of extraordinary diversity. The BIA has employed a variety 
of formulations to find that multiple crimes did not arise out of a 
single scheme, by focusing on such different factors as the unitary 
character of the alien's actions;13s the number of victims;136 the pas-
sage of time between crimes;137 the necessity of the first crime as 
malting possible further crimes;138 whether the crimes were moti-
vated by the same impulse;139 a "moral" characterization of the 
crimes;140 and whether the crimes shared a specific objective.141 
These diverse characterizations suggest much less the principled 
consistency of the BIA's view and much more the Board's desire to 
alter its reading of the statute to accommodate various factual 
circumstances. 
131. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. 
132. See In re Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992 WL 195812, at *l (BIA May 22, 
1992). 
133. Cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (The Supreme Court re-
jected deference to an interpretation of the Immigration statute by the BIA, in part because 
of "the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the years." The Court 
observed that "[t]he BIA has [interpreted the statute] in at least three different ways."). 
134. See Adetiba, 1992 WL 195812, at *l; In re J, ~ I & N Dec. 382 (BIA 1954). 
135. See In re B, I & N Dec. 236, 239 (BIA 1958) (finding that a single scheme existed, 
where "essentially one episode existed" (emphasis added}}. 
136. See In re B, 8 I & N Dec. at 239 (observing that a single scheme has been found 
"[w]here there is in fact one physical act affecting one person" (emphasis added}}. 
137. See In re B, 8 I & N Dec. at 239 (observing that a single scheme has been found 
"[w]here there are a series of similar acts which occurred at 'one time'" (emphasis added)). 
138. See In re B, 8 I & N Dec. at 239 (observing that a single scheme has been found 
"[w]here the acts occur within a comparatively short time of each other, involve the same 
parties, and the first act or acts are committed for the purpose of making possible the specific 
criminal objective accomplished by the last of the criminal acts" (emphasis added)). 
139. See In re Pataki, 15 I & N Dec. 324, 326 (BIA 1974) (observing that a single scheme 
has been found where "both crimes were committed within a few minutes of each other as 
the result of the same criminal impulse" (emphasis added}}. 
140. See In re D, 5 I & N Dec. 728, 730 (BIA 1954) (holding there is a single scheme 
where "morally the transaction constitutes only a single wrong" (emphasis added)). 
141. See In re Z, 6 I & N Dec. 167, 171 (BIA 1954) (holding there is a single scheme 
where "both [crimes] are .•. designed to accomplish a specific and limited criminal objective" 
(emphasis added}}. 
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CoNcLusmN: THE CASE FOR STEP Two 
This Note has argued that under the analysis of Chevron, courts 
should reject the BIA's interpretation of the single-scheme excep-
tion. It has provided two alternative arguments to support this con-
clusion - one at each of Chevron's two steps.142 Given that when 
the Supreme Court has rejected an agency's interpretation under 
Chevron, it has almost always done so at the first step of the analy-
sis, 143 it would seem most in line with this precedent for courts to 
reject the BIA's test at Chevron's first step. Nevertheless, this Note 
concludes that rejecting the BIA's test at the second step is a pref-
erable approach.144 In this regard, it has provided a standard of 
judicial review for courts to apply at this second step derived from 
traditional judicial insights regarding when courts should defer to 
agency interpretations of statutes. This understanding of step two 
focuses on the underlying important questions of which institution 
142. The necessity of providing both arguments is due to the uncertainty in when the 
Supreme Court's standards will find a statute to be sufficiently ambiguous to require a court 
to ignore what might seem to be the most plausible interpretation and move on to the analy· 
sis at step two. See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text. 
143. According to Professor Merrill's encyclopedic analyses, through the 1992 term, the 
Supreme Court clearly applied the Chevron framework to reject agency interpretations four-
teen times. In all fourteen cases, it rejected the agency's view at step one by finding that the 
statute embodied a clear meaning that was different from the view adopted by the agency. 
Merrill, Textualism, supra note 85, at 1034-38; Merrill, supra note 86, at 376-77. But see supra 
notes 91-94 and accompanying text (describing two recent cases where the Court apparently 
struck down agency interpretations at step two). 
144. If a court rejects an agency's interpretation at Chevron's step two, it remains unclear 
whether the court should itself independently interpret the statute or remand to the agency 
for a new interpretation. Strong institutional arguments can be made in favor of a court 
independently construing a statute after it has rejected deference to an agency at step two. 
First, if a court knows that it will have to remand, then the only way it will be able to inter-
pret the statute itself is by finding sufficient clarity to satisfy Chevron's step one. Therefore, 
remand may give a court incentive to strain to find clarity at step one in order to adopt its 
own interpretation. Second, if courts independently interpret after rejecting an agency inter-
pretation at step two, this provides an even stronger incentive for agencies to do a good job 
of interpreting the statute the first time around. Finally, such independent interpretation 
may be more efficient than a time-consuming remand. If a court were to interpret indepen-
dently the single-scheme exception after rejecting the BIA's single-act test, the arguments 
provided in section III.A would support a single-plan test interpretation. Additionally, a 
court might elaborate on this test regarding how closely related the crimes need to be to 
satisfy the idea of coherence in the word scheme - for example, by requiring that all the 
crimes be necessary to accomplish one specific objective and that they be close in time and 
space. 
Nevertheless the logic of Chevron seems to require a court to remand the interpretive 
question to the agency. If a court remanded the single-scheme exception to the BIA for a 
second chance to fill the policy gap in the statute, what would be a reasonable and permissi-
ble interpretation? This Note has concluded both that the single-act test is simply too 
strained a reading of the statutory text and that the single-plan test embodies a natural and 
ordinary meaning of the text. Thus the BIA could adopt a version of the single-plan test, 
perhaps as elaborated earlier. Whether or not the BIA could reasonably and permissibly 
formulate some other standard, such as the Fust Circuit's time-to-reflect test, should turn on 
how well-reasoned the BIA's new interpretation is and how far it stretches the statutory text. 
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is better suited to answer the interpretive question and whether 
Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency. 
Such an application of Chevron's step two is preferable to a 
Chevron that invariably rejects agency interpretations at step one, 
for three reasons. First, such a step-two analysis is the best way to 
allocate questions of statutory interpretation between institutions 
by comparing their · strengths and weaknesses. As Chevron ob-
served, agencies are often better interpreters of statutes where they 
are more politically accountable and have greater expertise than 
courts. But agencies may be driven by political pressures to warp 
the meaning of statutes or by the pressures of a heavy administra-
tive caseload to engage in cursory and inconsistent reasoning. 
Moreover, for some questions of statutory interpretation the agen-
cies may not possess a comparative advantage in expertise over the 
courts. In such situations, courts should police the agency's reason-
ing and ensure that the agency's discretion is confined to the 
boundaries of meaning that Congress established in the statute. 
Second, a focus on step two fosters a healthy institutional ten-
sion or dialogue between the judicial and administrative branches. 
Because courts always have the last word in interpreting statutes, 
the genius of Chevron was in requiring the courts presumptively to 
defer to an agency's interpretation that they otherwise would be 
under no requirement even to consider. But such a presumption 
should not be absolute. Rejecting agency interpretations at step 
two helpfully requires the courts to justify nondeference with good 
reasons - to explain why the court is a better interpreter of a par-
ticular statute in any given case. This understanding of Chevron's 
step two provides proper incentives both to the courts - requiring 
them to defer to agency interpretations unless they can articulate a 
good reason not to - and to the agencies, letting them know that 
courts will defer to their interpretations only if they engage in de-
tailed and reasoned analysis and do not stretch the statute's text to~ 
far beyond its ordinary meaning. 
Finally, by requiring legitimate reasons for courts to reject 
agency interpretations even where a statute is arguably ambiguous, 
this understanding of step two avoids a disingenuous and perplex-
ing debate about whether a statute is sufficiently clear. Although 
the clarity of congressional intent is surely one good reason to re-
ject unacceptable agency interpretations, it does not provide helpful 
guidance as to which is the better institution to interpret statutes 
that are not crystal clear. This Note concludes that Chevron's step 
two provides an effective way for courts to take up their traditional 
historical role of policing agency action. Such a role offers the best 
allocation of authority among institutions: agencies would have 
flexibility to make policy choices that would be presumptively valid, 
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and courts would retain the ultimate power to cabin agency discre-
tion within the bounds of the law, but only by providing particular 
good reasons for rejecting the agencies' views. 
